INTRODUCTION

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE GUIDE

There are many ways that this book could be organized. No single format would satisfy everyone's needs. This is true, in part, because the book is intended for a wide variety of people who already have, and require, different levels of understanding about the EEO process and the substantive law involved. The book is intended for use by laypersons, who have little or no understanding of the area; by human relations specialists; equal employment opportunity personnel; and less experienced representatives, who have some background and understanding of the procedures and substantive law; and by lawyers who are long-time EEO personnel, seasoned practitioners and administrative judges, who fully understand both the procedures and the law. In other words, this book is intended for use by the full array of individuals who must administer, implement, defend, prosecute, and adjudicate equal employment opportunity programs and cases in the federal sector.

The book is organized first to acquaint the reader with the statutory authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the federal sector EEO administrative process, including the precomplaint or counseling stage, and to give a complete overview of the formal complaint stage. Until October 1, 1992, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission operated the federal sector EEO process under 29 CFR Part 1613. As of October 1, 1992, the Commission’s regulations at 29 CFR Part 1614 became effective, and Part 1613 was abolished. Part 1614 revised the federal sector EEO administrative process. The Guide has been organized to be consistent with Part 1614. At the same time, because the Commission still looks to Part 1613 to interpret Part 1614, case law and guidance issued under Part 1613 are included in the guide to the extent they remain relevant. On July 12, 1999, the Commission amended Part 1614 to be effective November 9, 1999. The changes, which were significant, generated much in the way of comment from agencies, complainants’ representatives, and affected organizations. The changes brought about by the amendments are reviewed in Chapter 11, and discussed in detail throughout the book where appropriate. On May 21, 2002, the Commission issued a notice of final rulemaking amending 29 CFR 1614.203, 67 Fed. Reg. 35732. The rulemaking adopts the Commission’s guidance under the Americans with Disabilities Act at 29 CFR Part 1630 as being applicable in federal sector cases effective June 20, 2002, thereby replacing its previous guidance issued under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Pursuant to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, the Commission issued its Notice of Final Rulemaking adopting changes to Part 1630 to make it consistent with the ADAAA. The amendments to Part 1630 become effective May 24, 2011.

In December 2009, the EEOC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would make several discrete, though largely insignificant changes, to Part 1614 and the federal sector process. The most significant changes were to the class complaint processing regulations. The changes, published at 77 Fed. Reg. 43498-43545 (July 25, 2012) became effective on September 24, 2012, brought the class complaint process in line with the individual complaint process and adopted a final agency action procedure requiring agencies to appeal findings of administrative judges in class complaints in the same manner as they must appeal individual complaint decisions. Other changes were mostly cosmetic and are noted in the appropriate chapters on the EEO complaint process.

Although the regulations of the EEOC set forth the administrative process in general detail, the Commission supplements the regulations through management directives issued to federal agencies. These management directives contain further explanation, guidance, and clarification of the Commission’s position on a wide range of substantive and procedural issues in much the same way that the Federal Personnel Manual formerly supplemented the regulations of the Office of Personnel Management. Of particular significance is Management Directive (“MD”) 110, Federal Sector Complaints Processing Manual, which was revised in November 1999 to implement the Commission’s amendments to Part 1614. MD–110 is now available online at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/md110/md.html, and has also been included in relevant sections of the Guide. The importance of MD–110 should not be overlooked; the “Commission’s guidance is binding in nature, Federal agencies are required to comply with it.” MD–110 at p. 2. One of the few other changes of any significance in the Commission’s 2012 rulemaking was the addition of 29 CFR 1614.102(c), making clear that compliance with Part 1614 and EEOC Management Directives and Bulletins is mandatory on the part of agencies.

As of July 1, 2002, the Commission published a Handbook for Administrative Judges. The Judges’ Handbook contains standardized procedural guidance for the processing of cases at the hearing stage and also contains considerable guidance on discovery and summary judgment. The Judges’ Handbook is discussed in Chapter 6.

In October 2003, the Commission issued Management Directive 715 with guidance to federal agencies for establishing and maintaining affirmative employment programs under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. The Management Directive requires federal agencies to do an annual self-analysis of complaint activity and processing and to scrutinize the resulting data for employment barriers to protected groups. MD–715 is discussed in Chapter 1 under the subheading “Management Directive 715.”

The Commission also publishes, from time to time, “Enforcement Guidance” and “Field Instructions” on various topics of interest in the field of discrimination law that set forth the Commission’s position and case law, as well as the case law of the federal courts. The Commission has issued and periodically updates an EEOC Compliance Manual that contains additional guidance on substantive law. Also, a thorough familiarity with remedies will help avoid disputes. The Compliance Manual is drafted primarily with the private sector in mind, many sections are specifically applicable to the federal government and the Office of Federal Operations, the EEOC’s federal sector appellate branch, routinely relies on the Compliance Manual in its decisions.

Finally, the Commission publishes the Digest of Equal Employment Opportunity Law on a quarterly basis. The Digest reviews significant federal sector decisions issued by the Commission, the burdens of proof applicable to each theory. The purpose behind this organization is to give the reader a firm grasp of the entire EEO process and a basis for evaluating potential cases.

Chapters 13 through 17 deal with the actual prohibited bases of discrimination, i.e., race, color, sex, national origin, religion, disability status, age, and reprisal. The purpose of these chapters is to give the reader an understanding of how the analytical modes apply to the various bases of discrimination and to various modes of discrimination prohibited by specific bases. The next chapter, Chapter 18, focuses on how these bases of prohibited discrimination are applied to the wide variety of personnel actions and terms and conditions of employment encountered in the federal workplace.

A chapter on processing class action complaints, Chapter 19, has been included to follow the chapter on personnel actions. The chapter deals mainly with practice and procedure in class actions, as distinguished from individual complaints. Since the vast majority of agency and Commission cases deal with complaints of discrimination filed by individuals, the chapter has been segregated from the other chapters on the administrative processing of complaints to avoid confusion.

Chapter 20 deals with options for pursuing EEO complaints through negotiated grievance procedures and the Merit Systems Protection Board. In some instances, as addressed in that chapter, the employee will have the option of choosing one of those forums over the EEO process.

Next, the book contains chapters on forms of relief available through the EEO process, Chapter 21, and the recovery of attorney fees, Chapter 22. Since relief is, after all, the object of bringing any complaint and, at least from a complainant’s point of view, the desired culmination of all the effort that goes into a complaint, it seemed appropriate to reserve a discussion of relief until the end of the book. This is not to say that the chapter on relief is only for complainants. Agencies also should be familiar with their potential liabilities in a case, since such a determination may have considerable influence on settlement deliberations. Also, a thorough familiarity with remedies will help in cases where an agency enters a finding of discrimination and grants relief. In previous editions, the issues of relief and attorney were included in the same chapter. But with the passage of time, not to mention new legislation, each area has become complex enough to deserve separate treatment.
The Guide includes a subject matter index, a detailed table of contents, and a table of cases. It is anticipated that the book will not keep one so enthralled as to be read from cover to cover. Rather, it is anticipated that the book will be used by persons to gain a general understanding of specific areas of law, or to assist in answering particular questions about an individual case.

The book also is not designed to give the reader an exhaustive account of every case decided by the Commission on a particular subject. For the most part, string cites have been avoided. The author's intent is to give the reader a reasonably succinct statement of the law in a particular area, discuss the significant elements of the law, and then move on to other subjects.

One reason for avoiding string cites is that, in the past, the Commission, unlike the courts, issued written decisions in each case that came before it. Courts, on the other hand, do not always issue written decisions and even when they do, many are "unpublished" because the court does not believe the case is of precedential value or clarifies existing law in any way. Many of the Commission's past decisions lack any precedential or clarifying value. They are merely the basis for requested administrative resolution for the parties of cases that involve the application of well-established law to a particular set of facts. An attempt to include all of these cases in any book would add quantity, but not quality. In late 1997, the Commission adopted the practice of issuing "short form" decisions in many of its cases. Those decisions, without any discussion, provide a final administrative resolution to cases.

String cites also have been avoided because they tend to give the reader the impression that the author has made an extensive effort to include in the text all citations that are or may be relevant to a particular determination in a specific case. This, in turn, tends to discourage further research. For the practitioner, there is no substitute for an actual review of Commission decisions selected because of their relevance to a particular case. The book is intended to make the overall task of research easier, not to replace it. Review of additional Commission decisions which apply established law to various factual scenarios would enable the reader a better understanding of how to evaluate his or her own case.

Comments, be they on the organization, substance, style, or errors of commission or omission, are appreciated. Once the author has overcome the personal trauma of the particular criticism, comments will be assessed and possibly even used in subsequent revisions of the book. Of course, the author retains the right to label the commentator a fool and persist in his own backward and stubborn ways. Finally, the publisher retains the right to label the commentator a fool and insist on appropriate revisions.

This book is designed to be a resource for learning about the sometimes peculiar world of discrimination law in the federal sector. The author has sought to include some practical tips regarding the handling of those cases; those tips should not be construed as legal advice. In the end, there is no substitute for the preparation that goes into individual cases. It is hoped, however, that this Guide will make that preparation somewhat easier.

The Commission's decisions are published and available in printed form and on computer on-line services, greatly expanding the resources of both employees and agency representatives in pursuing discrimination complaints. The Commission has made some of its federal sector case law available on its website.

A. RESEARCH FOR THE BOOK


When the Guide was first published, the Commission's cases were available only on microfiche. The pieces of microfiche were numbered consecutively according to the order in which they were issued. Each piece also contained an issuance date, such as February–March 1987. Citations in the book to cases originally on microfiche are by case name, EEOC docket number, the number of the microfiche, the location on the microfiche of the first page of the decision, and the date of issuance by the Commission. For example, a citation of Smith v. Agency, 00000001, 1111/A1 (1985), is translated as follows: the first number following the case name is the docket number given to the case by the EEOC; the number on the left–hand side of the slash indicates the microfiche number (this is located in the top right–hand corner of the microfiche) and the number to the right of the slash indicates the location of the first page of the decision on the microfiche (horizontal rows are given letter designations from A to G starting at the top, vertical rows are given numbers from one to 14 from left to right); and the year indicates when the case was decided by the Commission.

Case decisions issued after the use of microfiche was discontinued are cited by EEOC docket number only. It is worth noting that many of the Commission's older decisions are not available online through any source. Contrary to popular belief, in an Internet dominated world, the fact that the cases cannot be found online does not mean they lack value. It simply means they are hard to find. The Commission's Office of Federal Operations is the best source for older cases, though this requires the use of a rather backward instrument called a telephone.

The docket numbers used by the EEOC also tell a great deal about the nature and history of the case. The first two digits in the docket number indicate how the case came to the Commission. The docket numbers "01" indicate that the case was decided by the Office of Federal Operations on an appeal by a complainant from a final agency decision or final agency action; the docket numbers "02" indicate that the case is an appeal from a final grievance decision; the docket numbers "03" indicate that the decision involves a petition for review of a decision for the Merit Systems Protection Board; the docket numbers "04" indicate that the case involves a petition for enforcement of a Commission decision or settlement agreement; the docket numbers "05" indicate that the case involves a request to reopen a previous Commission decision; and the docket numbers "07" indicate that the case was decided by OFO on appeal from an agency which has declined to fully implement the decision of an administrative judge. Cases decided under the amended regulations at Part 1614 that became effective in November 1999, contained the letter "A" in the docket number until October 2006. The next two digits in the docket number indicate the year in which the appeal was first filed with the Commission. The final four digits are the actual case number.

As of October 2006, OFO adopted a new case docket numbering system. Cases still carry the two digit opening codes as described above. This is followed by the year in which the appeal was filed, e.g., "2006." Finally, the last digits are a notation of the order in which a particular case was filed with OFO in each calendar year. Appeals docketed under the former system are given a new docketing number at the time a decision is issued.

Of the appeals decided by the Commission, some are issued under the signature of the Executive Secretariat and some are issued under the signature of the Director of the Office of Federal Operations. When an appellate decision is signed by the Executive Secretariat, this indicates that the decision has actually been reviewed by the "03" decision maker. A decision signed by the signature of the Director of OFO has been issued directly from that office based on its authority delegated by the Commissioners. As a result, those decisions issued directly by the Commission are considered to be binding precedent. Ironically, even though OFO has direct review authority over the decisions of administrative judges, its decisions are not considered binding in the traditional sense. Instead, administrative judges are strongly encouraged to follow those decisions.

B. OTHER REFERENCE SOURCES

The EEOC relies heavily upon federal court cases in reaching its administrative decisions. Because the decisions of the EEOC are not subject to direct appellate review, court decisions seldom are binding upon the Commission in the traditional sense. In many instances, the Commission has adopted the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Certainly, the Commission will always consider any relevant court decisions brought to its attention in its own deliberations.

The Commission's regulations are published in full in the Code of Federal Regulations at Title 29, Part 1600, et seq. The Federal Register is often a useful source of additional information, since the comments of the Commission in adopting and amending regulations may give insight as to their scope and intent. This is particularly true of the changes brought about by Part 1614. In the proposed versions of the regulations, as well as the final version, the Commission provided detailed comment on the deficiencies of Part 1613 and how the new regulations are intended to address those deficiencies. The legislative history of Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and all their amendments also should not be overlooked when dealing with issues on which there is little other guidance.
I. AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission derives its authority and jurisdiction over federal sector discrimination complaints from three primary pieces of legislation: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as amended. On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed Public Law 102–166, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made several amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as some modifications to the Rehabilitation Act. On October 29, 1992, the Rehabilitation Act was amended through Public Law 102–569. Through this amendment, some of the requirements of the more stringent Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Public Law 101–336 (July 26, 1990), were made applicable to the federal government. Most recently, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406 (September 25, 2008), which enacted significant revisions to the ADA. The amendments are summarized below and discussed in detail in Chapter 14.

As explained more fully in the following chapters, there are other pieces of legislation which either give the Commission additional authority or indirectly impact upon its own authority. However, Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA account for the vast majority of the EEOC caseload. The Commission also has a statutory responsibility, and is vested with jurisdiction and authority with respect to employment discrimination in the private sector. However, its role in the private sector should not be confused with its role in the federal sector. In the private sector, the Commission investigates complaints of employment discrimination within its jurisdiction and, when it deems appropriate, can initiate civil actions against employers it believes have engaged in prohibited discrimination.

In the federal sector, the Commission is the body which exercises jurisdiction and authority with respect to agency processing of EEO complaints, adjudicating complaints when a hearing is requested, and deciding appeals from final agency actions or decisions on discrimination complaints. As a result of the different roles the Commission has in the private and federal sector, the processes in each sector are quite different.

The Commission also has jurisdiction over federal sector complaints of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII. That jurisdiction is concurrent with its Title VII jurisdiction over complaints based on sex discrimination. The provisions of the Equal Pay Act are summarized below under the subheading “Equal Pay Act” and the subject is treated in more detail in Chapter 13 under the topic of “Sex Discrimination.”

In the federal sector, the EEOC also is responsible for coordinating the government’s policy prohibiting discrimination against employees based on protected genetic information. The EEOC’s jurisdiction in this area originally came from Executive Order 13145. That Executive Order was expanded through the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 discussed briefly below and more extensively in Chapter 15. Although the various pieces of legislation referenced above give the EEOC its substantive jurisdiction over employment discrimination in federal employment on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, disability status age and genetic information, it was another piece of legislation—the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978—that centralized jurisdiction in the Commission over federal sector employment discrimination. The Civil Service Reform Act is discussed more fully below under the section “Effect of the Civil Service Reform Act.”

1. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act

As originally passed, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 USC 2000e, et seq., did not apply to employees or applicants for employment in the federal government. It was not until March 24, 1972, the effective date of Public Law 92–261, that discrimination in the federal workplace was prohibited by statute. Since that time, discrimination complaints in the federal government have spawned voluminous and often confusing case law, but the prohibition had a rather inauspicious beginning. Under the 1972 amendments, 717(a) of the Title VII, codified at 42 USC 2000e–16(a), simply states:

All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Originally, enforcement authority was given to the former Civil Service Commission, 42 USC 2000e–16(b) (1978).

Unlike the Rehabilitation Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII applies to everyone. Everyone has a race, color, sex, and national origin. Presumably, everyone also has a religion, or the absence of one. (Theological discussions are distinctly beyond the province of this book.) It is worth noting that Title VII does not prohibit all discrimination or all unfair treatment. Title VII applies strictly to the five bases enumerated in the statute.

The federal government was specifically excluded from the definition of an “employer” under the Title VII. In 1974, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was given authority to issue regulations to establish procedures to handle discrimination complaints in the federal government. That authority was transferred to the EEOC under § 4 of the Reorganization Plan No. 1 and § 1–100 of Executive Order 12106 (Dec. 28, 1978).

In July 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, Public Law 101–336, 104 Stat. 327, codified at 42 USC 12101, et seq. However, the United States and corporations wholly owned by the United States are excluded from the definition of “employer” under the Act. 42 USC 12111(5)(B). A section of the ADA, 42 USC 12111(7), defined “employment in the federal government” as “employment in an agency, subdivision, or unit of the Federal Government, including the Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission.”

In October 1992, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, 42 USC 791(g), making further provisions of the ADA applicable to the federal government:

The standards used to determine whether this section has been
violated in a complaint alleging nonaffirmative action employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as such sections relate to employment. The applicable sections of the ADA are codified at 42 USC 12111, et seq., and 42 USC 12201–204 and 12210. The October 1992 amendment also substituted the terminology of “individuals with disabilities” for “handicapped employees.” The October 1992 amendment also substituted the terminology of “individuals with disabilities” for “handicapped employees.”

The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as such sections relate to employment.

No employer having employees subject to the provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to equal employment in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex; Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.

Federal agencies are included within the definition of employer under 29 USC 203(d)–(e). Enforcement authority for the Equal Pay Act was vested in the Administrator, Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division. See 29 USC 204. Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, Equal Pay Act enforcement authority was transferred to the EEOC. See Reorganization Plan No. 1, § 1. Under previous regulations at 29 CFR Part 1613, the Commission established a separate administrative procedure for pursuing federal sector EPA complaints. Such complaints initially had to be filed with the appropriate district director of the EEOC and were not initiated by contracting an agency EEO counselor. Under Part 1614, complaints under the EPA are processed just as any other complaint of discrimination.

As with the ADEA, complainants alleging a violation of the EPA are not required to pursue an administrative complaint of discrimination. A complainant may file a civil action in U.S. district court within two years of the alleged violation, or three years if the violation is willful. See 29 CFR 1614.408.

All forms of sex-based wage discrimination under the EPA also are violations of Title VII and an employee can pursue both remedies simultaneously. The employee may not engage in double recovery for violations of both statutes, but is entitled to the highest recovery provided by either statute.

4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was passed in 1967 as Public Law 90–202. In 1974, the July Public Law 93–259, the ADEA was amended to prohibit age discrimination in the federal sector. Modeled largely after Title VII, in its substantive provisions, the Act provides at 29 USC 633(a):

All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age (except personnel actions with regard to aliens employed outside the United States), in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units in the government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Government Printing Office, the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress shall be made free from discrimination based on age.

Note that the ADEA does not prohibit all discrimination on the basis of age. For example, it does not prohibit an employer from deciding that a prospective employee is too young for a particular position. What the ADEA prohibits is discrimination against persons 40 years of age or older.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is covered in depth in Chapter 16, below. It is worth observing here that the Commission’s jurisdiction over ADEA complaints is more discretionary in nature than its jurisdiction over Title VII and Rehabilitation Act complaints. Employees with complaints under the ADEA must file an administrative complaint through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or they may elect to proceed directly into U.S. district court after giving notice of intent to sue to the EEOC. Employees with Title VII or Rehabilitation Act complaints must exhaust the administrative process before obtaining the right to sue in U.S. district court.

As with Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, administrative enforcement authority under the ADEA was initially vested in the Civil Service Commission and later transferred to the EEOC upon passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, See § 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 1, and § 1–101 of Executive Order 12106.

Also, as with Title VII, the ADEA was amended through the Congressional Accountability Act to delete the original reference to the legislative branch and to add the Government Printing Office and the General Accounting Office to the list of federal agencies subject to the ADEA. These ADEA provisions also took effect on January 23, 1996, and like their Title VII counterparts, required the appointment of an Administrative Conference and Judges by the President to Congress with recommendations on future ADEA coverage for judicial branch, Government Printing Office, General Accounting Office and Library of Congress employees. See “Statutory Authority” above.

Although the substantive proscription against age discrimination in the ADEA was patterned after the proscription against race, color, sex, national origin and religious discrimination in Title VII, the relief provisions of the ADEA more closely mirror the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. As a result, federal sector remedies, including the award of attorney fees, are different from those under Title VII. See Chapter 16, subheading “Attorney Fees.”

5. Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act intended to eliminate sex discrimination in the payment of wages. The relevant portion is codified at 29 USC 206(d) and provides:

No employer having employees subject to the provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to equal employment in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex; Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.

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All forms of sex-based wage discrimination under the EPA also are violations of Title VII and an employee can pursue both remedies simultaneously. The employee may not engage in double recovery for violations of both statutes, but is entitled to the highest recovery provided by either statute.


From a substantive point of view, the legislation made two important changes. First, it authorized the payment of compensatory damages for such things as emotional pain, suffering, and future economic losses. Although the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains a provision for punitive damages, the federal government is exempt from that provision. It also reversed, in part, the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 104 L. Ed.2d 733 (1989), that placed all aspects of the burden of proof in disparate or adverse impact cases on the plaintiff. In cases involving disparate impact employment discrimination, Congress reinstated the standard first set down by the court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed.2d 158 (1971). Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, if a plaintiff proves a prima facie case where the existence of discrimination is not in “hotly contested litigation,” the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer. See Chapter 11, subheadings “The Civil Rights Act of 1991” and “Agency’s Burden—Business Necessity.”

The 1991 Civil Rights Act also provides a “good faith” defense to claims of failure to make reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act. An employer may avoid an award of damages for violation of the reasonable accommodation clause if it can demonstrate that, in consultation with the disabled employee, it has made a good faith effort at reasonable accommodation.

With regard to persons employed by the federal government, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made two significant changes with respect to coverage. The 1991 Act extended the protection of Title VII to employees of the House of Representatives and also to such entities as the Architect of the Capitol, the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the U.S. Botanic Garden. The Act also extended the Authority of the Departments of Employment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and specified sections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to those employees. A section of the law designated as the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 further extended Title VII protections to employees of the U.S. Senate. Although the protections of Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA were extended to these employees, in most instances, the jurisdiction of the EEOC was not expanded to cover these employees and enforcement was through other means. Many of the coverage changes of the 1991 Civil Rights Act were temporary in nature and were superseded by the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995.

A full treatment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is included in Chapter 13.
The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Public Law 104–1, codified at 2 USC 1301, et seq., was a sweeping attempt to bring legislative branch employees, as well as employees of several other government entities, within the ambit of the antidiscrimination statutes with a centralized enforcement mechanism. While legislative branch employees were given expanded rights under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA, enforcement is through the Office of Compliance and not the EEOC. See 2 USC 1301, et seq.

For a detailed discussion of the Act, see Chapter 13 under the subheading “Congressional Accountability Act—Legislative Employees.”

8. No FEAR Act of 2002

The Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 became effective on October 1, 2003. The No FEAR Act has three basic components: (1) training for managers and employees on the antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws; (2) making the entity found to have engaged in discrimination or retaliation financially responsible for the costs of those violations. Section 203 provides:

- (a) the number of cases arising under each of the respective provisions of law covered by paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 201(a) in which discrimination on the part of such agency was alleged,
- (b) the status or disposition of cases described in paragraph (1),
- (c) the amount of money required to be reimbursed by such agency under section 201 in connection with each of such cases, separately identifying the aggregate amount of such reimbursements attributable to the payment of attorneys’ fees, if any,
- (d) the number of employees disciplined for discrimination, retaliation, harassment, or any other infraction of any provision of law referred to in paragraph (1),
- (e) the final year-end data posted under section 301(c)(1)(B) for such fiscal year (without regard to section 301(c)(2)), and
- (f) a detailed description of—
  (A) the policy implemented by such agency to discipline employees who are disciplined in any judicial or administrative proceeding to have discriminated against any individual in violation of any of the laws cited in section 201(c), and
  (B) with respect to each of such laws, the number of employees who are disciplined in accordance with such policy and the specific nature of the disciplinary action taken.

The act applies to all executive agencies as defined at 5 USC 105 and to the Postal Rate Commission and the U.S. Postal Service. Section 102(3).

One of the principal provisions of the act is to require that federal agencies found to have engaged in discrimination or retaliation reimburse a federal judgment fund out of their operating budgets. Section 201 of the act provides:

- (a) Applicability.—This section applies with respect to any payment made in accordance with section 2414, 2517, 2672, or 2677 of title 28, United States Code, and under section 1304 of title 31, United States Code (relating to judgments, awards, and compromise settlements) to any Federal employee, former Federal employee, or applicant for Federal employment, in connection with any proceeding brought by or on behalf of such employee, former employee, or applicant under—
  (1) any provision of law cited in subsection (c), or
  (2) any other provision of law which prohibits any form of discrimination, as identified under rules issued under section 204.

- (b) Requirement.—An amount equal to the amount of each payment described in subsection (a) shall be reimbursed to the fund described in section 1304 of title 31, United States Code, out of any appropriation, fund, or other account (excluding any part of such appropriation, of such fund, or of such account available for the enforcement of any Federal law) available for operating expenses of the Federal agency to which the discriminatory conduct involved is attributable as determined under section 204.

The act, in Section 202, further requires that federal employees, former federal employees and applicants for federal employment be provided with written notice of the rights and protections available to federal employees. That written notification must include the posting on the Internet. The section further requires that federal employees receive training on the rights available to them and the remedies for violation of those rights.

Section 203 of the act provides that each agency shall make annual reports on violations of the antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions and the costs of those violations. Section 203 provides:

- (a) Annual Report.—Subject to subsection (b), not later than 180 days after the end of each fiscal year, each Federal agency shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Attorney General an annual report which shall include, with respect to the fiscal year—
  (1) the number of cases arising under each of the respective provisions of law covered by paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 201(a) in which discrimination on the part of such agency was alleged,
  (2) the status or disposition of cases described in paragraph (1),
  (3) the amount of money required to be reimbursed by such agency under section 201 in connection with each of such cases, separately identifying the aggregate amount of such reimbursements attributable to the payment of attorneys’ fees, if any,
  (4) the number of employees disciplined for discrimination, retaliation, harassment, or any other infraction of any provision of law referred to in paragraph (1),
  (5) the final year-end data posted under section 301(c)(1)(B) for such fiscal year (without regard to section 301(c)(2)), and
  (6) a detailed description of—
    (A) the policy implemented by such agency to discipline employees who are disciplined in any judicial or administrative proceeding to have discriminated against any individual in violation of any of the laws cited in section 201(c), and
    (B) with respect to each of such laws, the number of employees who are disciplined in accordance with such policy and the specific nature of the disciplinary action taken.

- (b) First Report.—The 1st report submitted under subsection (a) shall include for each item under subsection (a) data for each of the 5 immediately preceding fiscal years (or, if not available for all 5 fiscal years, for however many of those 5 fiscal years for which data are available).

Section 204 of the act gives the President or his designee responsibilities for issuing rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and rules to “require that a comprehensive study be conducted in the executive branch to determine the best practices relating to the appropriate disciplinary actions” against federal managers and supervisors who engage in discrimination or retaliation.

Significantly, with respect to the EEOC, Section 206 of the act requires:

- (a) Study.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the General Accounting Office shall conduct a study relating to the effects of eliminating the requirement that Federal employees aggrieved by violations of any of the laws specified in paragraphs (7) and (8) of section 201(c) exhaust administrative remedies before filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such study shall include a detailed summary of matters investigated, of information collected, and of conclusions formulated that lead to determinations of how the elimination of such requirement will—
  (1) expedite handling of allegations of such violations within Federal agencies and will streamline the complaint-filing process,
  (2) affect the workload of the Commission,
  (3) affect established alternative dispute resolution procedures in such agencies, and
post on their public websites a summary of statistical information relating to

The act, at Section 301, also requires that federal agencies, on an annual basis, post on their public websites a summary of statistical information relating to

attorney general a report containing the information required to be included in such study.

Subsection C requires agencies to compile and publish interim year-to-date data, final year-end data, and data for the five preceding fiscal years.

Finally, Section 302 of the act requires the EEOC to post the following statistical data on its website:

Initially adopted through Executive Order 13145, "[i]t is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal employment for all qualified persons and to prohibit [discrimination] against employees based on protected genetic information, or information about a request for or the receipt of genetic services." The Executive Order applied to the Department and agencies of the federal government only and its policies were extended to all federal employees covered by Title VII. Unlike its statutory jurisdiction, the EEOC did not have the authority under the Executive Order to directly adjudicate complaints of discrimination based on genetic information. The Executive Order did not create any enforceable rights for the employees covered. The EEOC's responsibility under the Executive Order was to coordinate the federal government's policy prohibiting genetic discrimination.


The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act is discussed more fully in Chapter 15.

B. EFFECT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT

In 1978, as a result of Reorganization Plans Nos. 1 and 2, the functions of the former Civil Service Commission regarding Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA were transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, effective January 1, 1979. Reorganization Plans Nos. 1 and 2 of 1978 served as the bases for the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Public Law 95-454 (Oct. 23, 1978). Prior to this time, the EEOC had only enforcement authority in matters involving private sector employment.

The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) represented the first major overhaul of federal personnel law in nearly 100 years. In addition to transferring jurisdiction over discrimination complaints to the EEOC, the Act abolished the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and created the Office of Personnel Management to take over the administrative personnel functions of the CSC, and the Merit Systems Protection Board to take over many of the adjudicative functions of the CSC.
To some extent, the Civil Service Reform Act increased the number of avenues through which discrimination complaints could be pursued. The Act made it a so-called "prohibited personnel practice" for federal sector supervisors and managers to engage in prohibited discrimination. In particular, 5 USC 2302(b) provides:

Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority—

(1) discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment—

(A) on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as prohibited under section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;

(B) on the basis of age, as prohibited under sections 12 and 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;

(C) on the basis of sex, as prohibited under section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938;

(D) on the basis of a handicapping condition, as prohibited under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; or

(E) on the basis of marital status or political affiliation, as prohibited under any law, rule or regulation. 

Under 5 USC 1201, et seq., employees or applicants for employment who believe they are the victims of prohibited personnel practices may file a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. The Special Counsel, originally a part of the Merit Systems Protection Board but now an independent agency, is authorized to investigate complaints and, where appropriate, seek both corrective action on behalf of the employee or applicant and disciplinary action against the offending officials. The Special Counsel has not pursued many corrective action complaints involving alleged discrimination due to a policy of deferring to the EEO process. While the Office of Special Counsel has not actively sought relief for the victims of discrimination, it has on a few occasions brought cases where an EEOC hearing was not requested, issuing a final decision on the complaint. The primary role of the Commission during the agency processing of a complaint is to provide an administrative judge for a hearing if one is requested by the complainant. Prior to November 10, 1999, the administrative judge could only issue a recommended decision which was subject to acceptance, rejection, or modification by the agency. Under a Notice of Final Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 37644 (July 12, 1999), the Commission essentially gave its administrative judges the authority to make binding decisions that either the complainant or the agency can appeal to the EEOC. The revised regulations still permit agencies to issue a "final action" decision indicating if it will fully comply with the decision of the administrative judge. However, if the agency does not fully comply with the decision of the administrative judge, it is required to file a simultaneous appeal with the EEOC Office of Federal Operations. A full discussion of the 1999 changes is included later in this chapter.

Once the agency issues a final decision on a discrimination complaint, the Commission has appellate jurisdiction over that decision. Appeals are filed with and decided by the Office of Federal Operations. The Office of Federal Operations employs attorney-advisors who can be of assistance in responding to questions about the Commission's appellate process.

It is the exception rather than the rule that the five-member Commission actually gets involved in a discrimination complaint. Final decisions of the Office of Federal Operations are subject to reconsideration by the Commission, but the decision to grant reconsideration is entirely discretionary on the part of the Commission.

When specific questions arise, they should be addressed to the appropriate division of the EEOC. Communications with the Commission regarding specific complaints should include the case name, agency case number, and EEOC case number.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission consists of five members, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each commissioner serves a term of five years. Not more than three members of the Commission can be of the same political party. The President is responsible for appointing both a chairman and vice chairman of the Commission from its members. See generally 42 USC 2000e-4.

A General Counsel to the Commission, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, serves a term of four years. The Commission is also authorized to appoint hearing examiners, attorneys, and other employees to carry out its functions under law.

The federal sector represents only a portion of the Commission's work. Its primary responsibilities lie in the private sector where it investigates complaints of discrimination and can serve as a prosecutor bringing suit against private sector employers that the Commission believes have engaged in prohibited discrimination. In the federal sector, the employing agency is responsible for conducting investigations into complaints of discrimination.

The Commission employs a cadre of administrative judges who hold hearings and issue decisions in federal sector cases and it also conducts an appellate review of those decisions as well as final agency decisions in cases where no hearing was requested.

It would not be unfair or inaccurate to describe the Commission's federal sector as being organizationally scattered. The Commission has district offices throughout the country. It also has field and area offices within each district. Each district also has a district director. The administrative judges work in the district, field and area offices. They report to a supervisory administrative judge, who, in turn, reports to his or her respective district director. At the headquarters level, the district offices are organizationally within the Office of Field Programs.

The Commission's federal sector appellate functions are centralized at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., in what was formerly the Office of Review and Appeals. Effective February 21, 1991, the Office of Review and Appeals officially became the Office of Federal Operations (OFO). See 58 Fed. Reg. 5983 (Feb. 21, 1991). All references to the Office of Review and Appeals in the Commission's regulations also were amended to reflect the change in name.

No substantive changes accompanied this change in name.

The net effect of the organizational structure of the EEOC is that the Office of Federal Operations establishes guidance and procedures for the administrative judges and, as part of its appellate process, reviews the work product of administrative judges. The judges themselves, however, work for and answer to the Office of Field Programs and not OFO. At times, this organizational structure has led to confusion as to the binding effect of the guidance and case decisions of OFO.

The EEO complaint process is summarized later in this chapter under the subheading "Processing Discrimination Complaints—Part 1614" and then treated in detail throughout the Guide. The EEOC does not, in the first instance, process discrimination complaints in the federal sector. Complaints are filed with the involved agency and that agency is responsible for investigating the complaint and, if appropriate, taking corrective action. Where an EEOC hearing is not requested, issuing a final decision on the complaint, the case is returned to the involved agency for corrective action.

Conversely, the provisions of the Reform Act may explain why an otherwise apparent discriminatory act on the part of the agency is in fact justified. For example, an agency removed an employee for misconduct and the employee believed the removal was in retaliation for a complaint filed with the EEOC. Later, the employee alleged that, in truth, the action was taken for a valid reason.

The Commission is not circumscribed by a defined set of personnel actions that it can or cannot investigate. Under a Notice of Final Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 37644 (July 12, 1999), the Commission is not required to investigate claims of discrimination which are the result of a private employment decision. The primary role of the Commission during the agency processing of a complaint is to provide an administrative judge for a hearing if one is requested by the complainant. Prior to November 10, 1999, the administrative judge could only issue a recommended decision which was subject to acceptance, rejection, or modification by the agency. Under a Notice of Final Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 37644 (July 12, 1999), the Commission essentially gave its administrative judges the authority to make binding decisions that either the complainant or the agency can appeal to the EEOC. The revised regulations still permit agencies to issue a "final action" decision indicating if it will fully comply with the decision of the administrative judge. However, if the agency does not fully comply with the decision of the administrative judge, it is required to file a simultaneous appeal with the EEOC Office of Federal Operations. A full discussion of the 1999 changes is included later in this chapter.

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When specific questions arise, they should be addressed to the appropriate division of the EEOC. Communications with the Commission regarding specific complaints should include the case name, agency case number, and EEOC case number.

D. JURISDICTION

The EEOC's jurisdiction to decide complaints of discrimination in the federal sector is rather simple. Unlike agencies such as the Merit Systems Protection Board or the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the authority of the Commission is not circumscribed by a defined set of personnel actions for federal agencies restricted to issues of collective bargaining. The Commission's jurisdiction extends to all personnel actions as well as the terms, conditions and privileges of employment provided the complainant alleges some form of discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, disability status, age, or genetic information. The Commission also has jurisdiction over any complaint alleging reprisal because of participation in the EEO process or opposition to an employment practice prohibited by Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADEA, or GINA, as well as by Commission regulation.

1. Covered Actions

Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADEA, and GINA cover all personnel actions, as well as the terms, privileges, and conditions of employment. From a purely technical point of view, the amendment that brought the federal government within the ambit of Title VII, requires only that all personnel actions shall be free
of discrimination” on the bases of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. See 42 USC 2000-e(16). However, the Commission has interpreted that provision consistent with the private sector prohibition at 42 USC 2000-e(2)(a)(1), which states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or because his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has been properly related to an anti-discrimination statute and, as a result, a discrimination complaint may be filed over anything from a removal action to a change in work hours. The only requirement is that the employee be “aggrieved” by the agency’s action. In order to be aggrieved, the employee must sustain an “injury in fact.” In legal terms, the issue of whether an employee is sufficiently aggrieved to bring a complaint is most often referred to as an issue of “standing.”

Over the years, the EEOC, through both regulations and case law, has circumscribed its jurisdiction to some degree. For example, in enacting Part 1614, the Commission removed proposed adverse actions from the scope of the complaint processing regulations on the theory that proposed actions do not sufficiently aggrieve an employee until or unless they become effective. Through case law, the Commission has removed midyear performance appraisals from the ambit of the complaint process. Again, the basic theory is that midyear performance appraisals that do not result in a formal rating, with some exceptions, do not cause sufficient harm to render an employee aggrieved until the final year-end rating issues.

In cases involving alleged retaliation for protected activity, the Supreme Court has broadened Commission jurisdiction holding that an employee can be aggrieved by actions both inside and outside the workplace that would be reasonably likely to deter a reasonable person from filing or pursuing an EEO complaint. See the section in Chapter 3 on “Standing: Failure to State a Claim,” for a detailed discussion; see also Chapter 18, “Personnel Actions”; and Chapter 17, “Reprisal.”

2. Employees Covered

The Commission’s jurisdiction, unlike that of the Merit Systems Protection Board, is not limited to those executive branch employees who have completed a probationary period and obtained conversion to permanent appointments. The EEOC has jurisdiction over all complaints of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability status, and genetic information even when the complainant is an applicant for federal employment. The few positions which are exempt constitute an exception rather than the rule. Under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and GINA, complainants must exhaust all administrative remedies before proceeding to U.S. district court. Under the ADEA and the EPA, complainants in the federal sector are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the involved agency, but may avail themselves of the administrative process. Utilizing the administrative process does not toll the statute of limitations for civil actions under the ADEA and the EPA.

Both Title VII and the ADEA confer protection on competitive service employees of the judicial branch. Under legislation, discussed above, competitive service employees from the legislative branch have been removed from the jurisdiction of the EEOC. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the Commission does not have jurisdiction over complaints by competitive service employees in the legislative and judicial branches of government. The issue of coverage of competitive service employees in the legislative and judicial branches is discussed earlier under the subheading “Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” See also discussion later in this chapter on “Legislative and Judicial Branches.”


Uniformed military personnel are not within the Commission’s jurisdiction. See DeGroat v. Secretary of Air Force, 05900409, 2706/A2 (1990). However, there are circumstances where military employees, such as National Guard technicians who perform both military and civilian duties, can come within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Such cases generally involve civilian status; discrimination involves civilian or military duties. See the section later in this chapter discussing “Military Employees”; Chapter 3, “Military Departments.”

The Commission’s jurisdiction over complaints by federal employees does not extend to employees of state government whose positions are funded by federal grants. See Kirchner v. Secretary of Agriculture, 01892984, 2314/D (1985). For further discussion of the employees covered by the antidiscrimination statutes, see Chapter 3, “Standing: Failure to State a Claim.”

3. Agencies Covered

As noted above, the jurisdiction of the Commission extends to all employees within the executive agencies covered by the antidiscrimination statutes, with exclusions from coverage being the exception rather than the rule. The military agencies include the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. See 5 USC 102. Executive agencies covered are defined at 5 USC 105 as “an executive department, a Government corporation, or an independent establishment.”

Government employees are defined by reference in section 103 of Title 5 as any corporation owned or controlled by the United States. Independent establishments include the General Accounting Office and any “establishment” in the executive branch which is not a department, military department, or government corporation. 5 USC 104. The U.S. Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission are specifically covered by the acts.

Under Title VII, as originally amended to apply to federal employees, the General Accounting Office was exempt from coverage. 42 USC 2000e-16(a) (1978). The General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office have since been added to the list of independent establishments coming within the ambit of Title VII. Under Title VII and the ADEA, as originally amended to include federal workers, the Commission also had jurisdiction over complaints of discrimination for competitive service employees in the government of the District of Columbia, the federal judicial and legislative branches and the Library of Congress. Note that with respect to these units of government the Commission’s jurisdiction was circumscribed to include only competitive service employees. The Commission, as noted above, does not have jurisdiction over complaints by competitive service employees in the legislative and judicial branches under the Rehabilitation Act. The Commission’s jurisdiction over legislative branch employees was eliminated with the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, discussed earlier under the heading “Congressional Accountability Act of 1995.”

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the protections of Title VII to employees of the House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate and the legislative agencies. The legislation provided that the House and Senate shall establish procedures for processing discrimination complaints. The legislation did not make clear what role, if any, the Commission would have in such complaint procedures. The procedures for enforcing the antidiscrimination statutes for legislative branch employees were established under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995. See 2 USC 1301, et seq.

4. Unions

Labor unions fall within the coverage of Title VII. See 42 USC 2000e(d)–(e). There is a question as to whether unions fall within the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act. There is no comparable provision in that legislation. However, labor unions are covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act. There also remains a question as to whether federal sector labor unions are covered under the ADEA. Although the ADEA does apply to labor organizations, 29 USC 623(b), only certain portions of the ADEA apply to the federal government. See 29 USC 633a(f). It is not clear that the provision relating to labor unions applies to the federal government.

In Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 28 FEP 514 (8th Cir. 1982), the court found that a federal employee who alleged that a labor union discriminated against him on a basis prohibited by Title VII could file a complaint of discrimination directly with the EEOC. The court found that section 703(c) of Title VII was controlling. Section 703(c) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating against members on the bases of race, color, sex, religion and national origin, and also prohibits labor organizations from excluding persons from membership on those bases. A complaint cannot be filed with the agency where the employee works, since the agency has no control over any actions the union may take with respect to its members.

In Reardon v. USPS, 01860152, 1351/F12 (1986), the Commission decided that an employee could not file a complaint with his agency alleging that his union had engaged in disability discrimination. The Commission did not decide whether such an employee can file a complaint directly with the EEOC under Title VII, since that issue was not presented. The Commission did note that the Rehabilitation Act contains no provision similar to 5 783(c) of Title VII. However, 5 USC 7114(a)(1), states: “A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit it represents and is entitled to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees in the unit. An exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents regarding discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership.”

Section 7116(b)(4) of Title V specifically makes it an unfair labor practice: to discriminate against an employee with regard to the terms or conditions of membership in the labor organization on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, sex, age, preferential or nonpreferential civil service status, political affiliation, marital status, or handicapping condition;

Allegations of unfair labor practices fall within the province of the Federal Labor Relations Authority. See 5 USC 7118. However, at least one court has held that federal sector labor organizations are covered entities under the ADA. In Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 1999), the court found that a federal service worker could bring suit against the union under the ADA, though it ultimately dismissed the suit for other reasons. Agreeing with the EEOC, which filed an amicus curiae brief in the case and relying on Jennings, the court in Jones, 192 F.3d at 420, found:
The principal issue in this appeal is whether a labor union that represents federal employees may constitute a labor organization as that term is defined in the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC §§ 12101–12213, and therefore be subject to suit in federal district court for violations of 42 USC § 12112(a). Because the ADA provides that the term “labor organization” shall have the same meaning given that term in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, a federal court is required to construe this term using the interpretive tools that are available to it. To resolve the antecedent question of whether a labor union that represents federal employees may constitute a labor organization as that term is defined in Title VII. For the reasons that follow, we hold a labor union that represents federal employees may constitute a labor organization as that term is defined in Title VII and by proxy the ADA.

The Jones court, id. at 423–28, elaborated on this holding:

As previously stated, Congress defined the term “covered entity” in the ADA as “an employer, employer agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee,” 42 USC § 12111(2) (emphasis added) and expressly incorporated Title VII’s definition of “labor organization,” see id. § 12111(7). For its part, Title VII defines “labor organization” as:

"a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization."

Id. § 2000e(d) (emphasis added). Title VII goes on to state in a separate subsection of its definitional section that a labor organization “shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce,” if it maintains a hiring office or has fifteen or more members and falls within one of the following five categories:

1. is the certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act…, or the Railway Labor Act…;
2. although not certified, is a national or international labor organization or a local labor organization recognized or acting as the representative of employees of an employer or employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce; or
3. has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or actively seeking to represent employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2); or
4. has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking to represent employees within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body through which such employees may enjoy membership or become affiliated with such labor organization; or
5. is a conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council subordinate to a national or international labor organization, which includes a labor organization in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection.

Id. § 2000e(e).

The ADA also expressly adopts Title VII’s definitions of “commerce” and “industry affecting commerce.” See id. § 12111(7). Title VII defines the term “commerce” as “trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States, or between a State and any place outside thereof, or between points within the several States, or between points in the same State but through a point outside thereof.” Id. § 2000e(g). Title VII defines an “industry affecting commerce” as “any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes…any governmental industry, business, or activity.” Id. § 2000e(h). The ADA also defines “employee” and “employer” in language that closely approximates the definitions of those terms in Title VII. Compare 42 USC § 12111(4)–(5) (ADA), with 42 USC § 2000e(b), (f) (Title VII). Notably, both the ADA and Title VII’s definition of employer expressly exclude the United States or a corporation wholly owned by the government of the United States. See id. §§ 2000e(b) & 12115(1).

…After considering these points of reference, we conclude that Title VII’s definition of labor organization is ambiguous as to whether a labor organization that represents federal employees may be subject to liability under Title VII. First, the initial clause of Title VII’s definition of the term “labor organization”—“(the term ‘labor organization’ means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce,” 42 USC § 2000e(d)—begs the question of what is the nature of a labor organization for purposes of Title VII. Second, the balance of the definition, which uses the term “employer,” defined in § 2000e(b) as excluding the United States or an agency thereof, merely provides a nonexclusive list of organizations, agencies, employee representation committees, groups, associations, or plans that may constitute a labor organization under Title VII. See West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906, 1910 (1999) (other cites omitted).

The third circumstance creating ambiguity is that Title VII has a separate section specifically allowing federal employees to sue the United States for unlawful employment discrimination, but does not contain a parallel section adding labor organizations that represent federal employees. The fourth circumstance creating ambiguity is that although § 2000e(e) declares when a labor organization shall be “deemed” to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce, it does not purport to define the term “labor organization” itself. Fifth and finally, the legislative history of Title VII and the ADA is silent regarding whether a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and that represents federal employees is subject to their respective proscriptions.

Because we conclude Title VII’s definition of labor organization is ambiguous as to whether a labor organization that represents federal employees may be subject to liability under Title VII, we turn to consider the deference this court should afford the interpretation proffered by the EEOC, the agency charged with primary responsibility for enforcement of Title VII. See Tinsley’s, First Nat’l Bank of Carthage v. EEOC, 415 U.S. 441 (4th Cir. 1998). The level of deference that this court should afford the EEOC’s proffered interpretation “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).…[U]nder the circumstances of this case, we believe full Chevron deference is appropriate. After reading the EEOC’s brief and listening to its presentation at oral argument, we are convinced the EEOC thoroughly considered the statutory interpretation issues at hand. Furthermore, as we will explain in greater detail momentarily, we find its reasoning valid. Additionally, the EEOC’s position is consistent with its express agreement in its Compliance Manual with the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Jennings. See id. at 435–41; id. at 441 (4th Cir. 1998). Having determined that the EEOC’s proffered interpretation is entitled to full Chevron deference, we must next determine whether the EEOC’s proffered interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. If it is, then we must sustain the EEOC’s interpretation. See Molinar, 125 F.3d at 235. We have no trouble in concluding that it is, because the EEOC’s interpretation is “full Chevron” in that it has been interpreted to mean that, at a minimum, if a labor organization representing federal employees exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with the United States or an agency thereof concerning grievances, labor disputes, and the like of the federal employees it represents and is engaged in an “industry affecting commerce” as that term is defined in § 2000e(e), then this labor organization is subject to the provisions of Title VII and by proxy the ADA. This interpretation fully comports with Congress’s primary purpose in enacting those statutes of eradicating certain employment discrimination. Such an interpretation avoids the anomalous result, surely not intended by Congress, of nonfederal employees being allowed to sue their employer and labor organizations for violations of Title VII and the ADA, but federal employees only being allowed to sue their employer.

There is no dispute in this case that the Defendants represent federal employees and exist for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with the Postal Service concerning grievances, labor disputes, and the like. Furthermore, the Defendants’ significant representational activities on behalf of Postal Service employees fully support the conclusion that the Defendants are engaged in activities in commerce. See 42 USC § 2000e(h). Accordingly, the Defendants constitute labor organizations for purposes of Title VII and by proxy the ADA.

The court in Jones, 192 F.3d at 428–29, rejected the union’s argument that the Rehabilitation Act provided the exclusive remedy for federal employees for disability discrimination. Because the union and not the agency was the defendant, the court found no sovereign immunity question presented. Having found that the APWU was covered by subject matter jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit in Jones, id. at 429, held:

Although Jones wins the battle over subject matter jurisdiction, he ultimately loses the war. The district court should have granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The law is now settled that the ADA is not violated when an employer discharges an individual based upon the employee’s misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability. [cites omitted] Assuming Butts made the alleged discriminatory comments at issue to Postal Service officials and she represented the Defendants in doing so, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the Postal Service discharged Jones for any reason other
than the fact that he threatened the life of his supervisor. Because the ADA does not require an employer to ignore such egregious misconduct by one of its employees, even if the misconduct was caused by the employee’s disability, we remand this case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants.

In Bray v. Secretary of Treasury, 19148165, 4090/E7 (1994), the Commission refused to uphold the dismissal of a complaint on the basis of lack of jurisdiction because the disputed actions were taken by union officials. The Commission held that agency employees, acting under the guise of a union, insulation an agency from liability for discriminatory actions. See also Chapter 3, section on “Standing: Failure to State a Claim—Agency Jurisdiction.”

5. Remedial Powers

The Commission’s remedial powers are broad. Under 42 USC 2000e-16(b), the EEOC has the authority to grant such “appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section…” Subsection (b) of 29 USC 633a gives the Commission similar powers to grant remedial relief under the ADEA, as does the Rehabilitation Act at 29 USC 794a, which incorporated, by reference, Title VII remedies in cases involving disability discrimination.

The discrimination statutes, as originally passed, were all considered to be remedial or “make whole” statutes. The Commission’s remedial powers, while broad, did not encompass such items as punitive damages awards, or consequential damages suffered as a result of prohibited discrimination. The focus was on placing the employee who has been determined to have suffered discrimination in the same position he or she would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized both punitive and compensatory damages for such items as pain, suffering, humiliation, and inconvenience, as well as back pay and, in some cases, double back pay. The Commission’s remedial relief is not exempt from the punitive damages provision, but is subject to the provision for compensatory damages in cases involving intentional discrimination under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. See Jackson v. Postmaster General, 01923399, 3499/B12 (1992).

Although the 1991 Civil Rights Act did not include any provision addressing the retroactivity of its new remedies, the Commission initially issued a policy guidance statement declaring that the remedies were not retroactive and would only apply to complaints filed on or after November 21, 1991—the date the legislation became effective. The issue of retroactivity of the new remedies also was considered by several federal courts, with decisions split almost equally on whether or not the provision was retroactive. On April 13, 1993, the EEOC reversed its position and rescinded its earlier policy statement. The issue of the retroactivity of the 1991 Act was decided by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USL Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed.2d 229 (1994). The Court held that the substantive provisions of the Act were not retroactive and the compensatory damages provision did not apply to discriminatory acts occurring before the effective date of the legislation.

The focus of the original statutes was purely remedial and the new legislation exempted the federal government from punitive damages. The Commission does not have authority to order punitive measures against discriminating officials. In spite of this, it has taken a more aggressive posture toward alleged discriminating officials and held that it may review an agency’s determination to discipline offending officials as part of its overall mandate to order corrective action. The Commission also has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of Special Counsel and refers findings of discrimination to OSC for decisions on whether that office will bring disciplinary action against appropriate management officials.

While the Commission cannot order punishment of an offending government official, it can, and does, order broad remedial measures. The Commission routinely requires agencies to post Notices of Violation to publicize findings of discrimination. It also routinely orders agencies to provide specific training to managers and supervisors as a measure to correct past discrimination and prevent discrimination in the future.

Section 701(k) of Title VII provides that the prevailing party also may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. A similar provision appears in the Rehabilitation Act. Although the respective acts make no specific mention of attorney fees in the administrative process, in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed.2d 723 (1980), the Supreme Court held that § 701(k) does allow for recovery of fees for representation in the administrative process. See Patton v. Andrus, 459F. Supp. 1189 (D.D.C. 1978). The Commission’s authority to award fees in cases involving age discrimination is circumvented because the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as applied to federal employees, contains no provision for recovery of fees.

E. CIVIL ACTIONS

Title VII originally provided that complainants may file a civil action in U.S. district court within 90 days of a final decision of an agency or the EEOC, or within 180 days of filing a complaint with an agency or appeal with the EEOC, if no final action has been taken. 42 USC 2000e-16(c). As with complaints in the private sector, federal employees are entitled to a trial de novo. See 42 USC 2000e-16(d); 42 USC 2000e-5(f) through (k). The procedure also applies to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC 794a. Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the time for filing a civil action after a final agency decision or final decision of the Commission has been extended to 90 days. 42 USC 2000e-16(c). Although the language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act seems clear, some U.S. district courts have held that the 30-day filing limit still applies in cases on appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board where discrimination is raised in an affirmative defense. See, e.g., James v. United States, 888 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (applying 30-day statute of limitations). The cases are based upon 5 USC 7703, which still contains the 30-day statute of limitations and was not amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.

Unlike Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, an employee who believes he or she is aggrieved under the ADEA has the option of pursuing an administrative complaint with the agency and the EEOC, or filing an action in U.S. district court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC 633a(c). The employee must give the EEOC written notice of his decision not to contest adverse action in the administrative process within 30 days of receiving written notice of the decision or contesting the action in the administrative process. 29 USC 621 et seq. An agency decision not to contest adverse action is binding on the agency. See, e.g., Carey v. Postmaster General, 791 et seq. If the EEOC agrees with the employee, it will send a letter of determination to the employee and the agency. The employee then has 30 days to file suit in U.S. district court. If the employee does not file suit in U.S. district court within 90 days of the decision or contesting the action in the administrative process, the right to sue is lost.

The federal government, however, is exempt from an award of punitive damages. Jury trials are not available for federal employees under the ADEA or the EPA because the 1991 Civil Rights Act did not amend those statutes.

II. AGENCY EEO PROGRAMS

The EEO process is administered by each federal agency individually, subject to review and oversight by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The programs are premised on a two-fold statement of policy, as described at 29 CFR 1614.101:

(a) It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap and to promote the full realization of equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative program in each agency.

(b) No person shall be subject to retaliation for opposing any practice made unlawful by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (title VII) (42 USC 2000e et seq.), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (29 USC 621 et seq.), the Equal Pay Act (29 USC 206(d)) or the Rehabilitation Act (29 USC 791 et seq.) or for participating in any stage of administrative or judicial proceedings under those statutes.

This simple statement of policy, however, swamps a complex and often confusing set of procedures for the processing of discrimination complaints. In addition to their responsibilities for processing complaints of discrimination, each agency is responsible for promulgating programs designed to eradicate discrimination and to promote equal opportunity employment.

The regulations governing the federal sector process are set forth in 29 CFR Part 1614 and supplemental guidance is provided by EEOC Management Directive 110 (MD-110).

A. ORGANIZATION OF PART 1614

In originally promulgating 29 CFR Part 1614 in 1992, the EEOC consolidated and streamlined its former regulations for processing EEO complaints. The Commission’s previous regulations, at 29 CFR Part 1613 contained several diverse sections that dealt with the administrative processing of complaints. It also contained separate sections for discrimination complaints based on any of the major laws (i.e., Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, age discrimination, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), which required the development of separate subparts for each type of complaint, e.g., Title VII complaints, mixed case complaints, age complaints, class complaints, handicap complaints, and race complaints. The regulations were duplicative, confusing, and required extensive cross-referencing to understand them. This method of organization was abandoned in Part 1614. As the Commission explained in its notice of final rulemaking published in the Federal Register on April 10, 1992:

Part 1614 is organized differently than Part 1613. Part 1613 contains separate subparts for each type of complaint, e.g., Title VII complaints, mixed case complaints, age complaints, class complaints, handicap complaints, race complaints, and so on. The regulations were created to avoid repetition and extensive cross-referencing by consolidating the complaint processing procedures as much as possible. The new part is organized into six subparts. Subpart A concerns the agencies’ programs for promoting equal employment opportunity and the procedures for agency processing of individual complaints of discrimination.

Subpart B provides additional provisions that are applicable to the courts and the particular administrative agencies (i.e., the Merit Systems Protection Act, Rehabilitation Act, class). Subpart C explains the relationship between the EEO process and the negotiated grievance process and between the EEO process and appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Subpart D describes appeals to EEOC and the right to file civil actions under each statute administered by EEOC. Subpart E sets forth EEOC’s policy on remedies and relief when discrimination has occurred.
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be addressed by Congress.
difficulties in applying the statutory scheme in this area. Often, complainants be addressed by Congress.


B. AGENCY PROGRAMS

The processing of discrimination complaints is only one aspect of an agency’s responsibilities under the antidiscrimination statutes. Pursuant to 29 CFR 1614.102, each agency is required to establish an EEO program to eliminate discrimination and promote equal opportunity. Effective October 1, 2003, the EEOC issued Management Directive 715 (MD-715), which further refines and defines the responsibilities of agencies to promote equal employment opportunities. The directive also contains guidance to agencies for compliance with the No FEAR Act, discussed above under the heading “No FEAR Act of 2002.”
The EEOC is not simply an adjudicator of federal sector complaints of discrimination. Its statutory mandate under both Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act includes implementing so-called “affirmative programs of equal employment opportunity.” Through Part 1614 and MD-715, the Commission has sought to fulfill that mandate by requiring federal agencies to develop, implement, assess, and report on plans to promote equal employment opportunity.
The affirmative employment programs are sometimes referred to as “affirmative action” programs. Affirmative action in these programs should not be confused with court-ordered affirmative action. The object of the Commission’s affirmative employment program policies is to increase employment opportunities for all individuals, regardless of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability in all agencies of the federal government. Court-ordered affirmative action is a remedy for discrimination where an employer has demonstrated a long-standing resistance to the antidiscrimination laws.

1. Affirmative Employment Under Part 1614

The basic obligations of agencies to promote equal employment opportunity are set forth in 29 CFR Part 1614. Section 102 defines the nature of the program each agency is required to establish:

(a) Each agency shall maintain a continuing affirmative program to promote equal opportunity and to identify and eliminate discriminatory practices and policies. In support of this program, the agency shall:

(1) Provide sufficient resources to its equal employment opportunity program to ensure efficient and successful operation;

(2) Provide for the prompt, fair and impartial processing of complaints in accordance with this part and the instructions contained in the Commission’s Management Directives;

(3) Conduct a continuing campaign to eradicate every form of prejudice or discrimination from the agency’s personnel policies, practices and working conditions;

(4) Communicate the agency’s equal employment opportunity policy and program and its employment needs to all sources of job candidates without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic information, and solicit their recruitment assistance on a continuing basis;

(5) Review, evaluate and control managerial and supervisory performance in such a manner as to insures a continuing affirmative application and vigorous enforcement of the policy of equal employment opportunity, and provide orientation, training and advice to managers and supervisors to assure their understanding and implementation of the equal employment opportunity policy and program;

(6) Take appropriate disciplinary action against employees who engage in discriminatory practices;

(7) Make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of applicants and employees when those accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the business of the agency;

(8) Make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of qualified applicants and employees with handicaps unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the agency’s program;

(9) Provide recognition to employees, supervisors, managers and units demonstrating superior accomplishment in equal employment opportunity;

(b) In order to implement its program, each agency shall:

(1) Develop the plans, procedures and regulations necessary to carry out its program;

(2) Establish or make available an alternative dispute resolution program. Such program must be available for both the pre-complaint process and the formal complaint process.

(3) Appraise its personnel operations at regular intervals to assure their conformity with its program, this part 1614 and the instructions contained in the Commission’s management directives;

(4) Designate a Director of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO Director), EEO Officer(s), and such Special Emphasis Program Managers (e.g., People With Disabilities Program, Federal Women’s Program and Hispanic Employment Program), clerical and administrative support as may be necessary to carry out the functions described in this part in all organizational units of the agency and at all agency installations. The EEO Director shall be under the immediate supervision of the agency head;

(5) Make written materials available to all employees and applicants informing them of the variety of equal employment opportunity programs and administrative and judicial remedial procedures available to them and prominently post such written materials in all personnel and EEO offices and throughout the workplace;

(6) Ensure that full cooperation is provided by all agency employees to EEO Counselors and agency EEO personnel in the processing and resolution of pre-complaint matters and complaints within an agency and that full cooperation is provided to the Commission in the course of appeals, including granting the Commission routine access to personnel records of the agency when required in connection with an investigation; and

(7) Publicize to all employees and post at all times the names, business telephone numbers and business addresses of the EEO Counselors unless the counseling function is centralized, in which case the counseling function is centralized, in which case only the telephone number and address need be publicized and posted), a notice of the time limits and necessity of contacting a Counselor before filing a complaint and the telephone numbers and addresses of the EEO Director, EEO Officer(s) and Special Emphasis Program Managers.

(c) Under each agency program, the EEO Director shall be responsible for:

(1) Advising the head of the agency with respect to the preparation of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans, procedures, regulations, reports and other matters pertaining to the policy in § 1614.101 and the agency program;

(2) Evaluating from time to time the sufficiency of the total agency program for equal employment opportunity and reporting to the head of the agency with recommendations as to any improvement or correction needed, including remedial or disciplinary action with respect to managerial, supervisory or other employees who have failed in their responsibilities;
3. When authorized by the head of the agency, making changes in programs and procedures designed to eliminate discriminatory practices and to improve the agency's program for equal employment opportunity;
4. Providing for counseling of aggrieved individuals and for the receipt and processing of individual and class complaints of discrimination; and
5. Assuring that individual complaints are fairly and thoroughly investigated and that final decisions are issued in a timely manner in accordance with this part.

Subsection (e) and (f), which were part of the 2012 amendments require that agencies comply with EEOC management directives and bulletins, submit a program for EEOC review of agency EEO programs, and allows the EEOC to grant variances from the Part 1614 procedures:

(e) Agency programs shall comply with this part and the Management Directives and Bulletins that the Commission issues. The Commission will review agency programs from time to time to ascertain whether they are in compliance. If an agency program is found not to be in compliance, efforts shall be undertaken to obtain compliance. If the efforts are not successful, the Chair may issue a notice to the head of any federal agency whose programs are not in compliance and publically identify each non-compliant agency.

(f) Unless prohibited by law or executive order, the Commission, in its discretion and for good cause shown, may grant agencies prospective variances from the complaint processing procedures prescribed in this Part. Variances will permit agencies to conduct pilot projects of proposed changes to the complaint processing requirements of this Part that may later be made permanent through regulatory change. Agencies requesting variances must identify the specific section(s) of this Part from which they wish to deviate and exactly what they propose to do instead, explain the expected benefit and expected effect on the process of the proposed pilot project, include the proposed duration of the pilot project, and discuss the method by which they intend to evaluate the success of the pilot project. Variances will not be granted for individual cases and will usually not be granted for more than 24 months. The Director of the Office of Federal Operations for good cause shown may grant requests for extensions of variances for up to an additional 12 months. Pilot projects must require that program participants voluntarily opt-in to the pilot project. Requests for variances should be addressed to the Director, Office of Federal Operations.

Although it is the focus of this book, the processing of discrimination complaints is only a small portion of an agency's obligations under Part 1614.

In addition to the regulatory requirement that the EEO director report directly to the agency head, MD-110 requires that the EEO director have independent authority to carry out the agency's EEO programs. MD-110 at 1-3 also specifically prohibits EEO personnel from serving as agency representatives for agencies or complainants.

2. Management Directive 715

On October 1, 2003, the EEOC issued Management Directive 715 governing equal employment opportunity programs in the federal sector. MD-715 supersedes Management Directive 714 (October 6, 1987), and all interpretive memoranda. MD-715 addresses affirmative employment responsibilities of federal agencies under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. There are no affirmative employment requirements in the provisions of the ADEA that apply to the federal sector.

MD-715 applies to “all executive agencies and military departments (except uniformed members) as defined in Sections 102 and 105 of Title 5 USC (including those with employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), the United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Smithsonian Institution, and those units of the judicial branch of the federal government having positions in the competitive service.” MD-715 is divided into three subparts. Subpart A “provides policy guidance and standards for establishing and maintaining effective affirmative programs of equal employment opportunity” under Title VII. Subpart B provides policy guidance for “effective affirmative action programs” under the Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, Subpart C sets forth general reporting requirements of agencies on their efforts to achieve equal employment opportunity. When issued in 2003, the EEOC announced plans to issue further guidance and instructions on implementing the policies of MD-715, but as of 2015 no further guidance has been issued.

The introduction to MD-715 sets forth the purpose of the directive:
The United States government employs over two million men and women across the country and around the world. The ability of our government to meet the employment needs of our nation and the American people squarely on these dedicated and hard-working individuals. Perhaps now more than ever before—with increasing public expectations of governmental institutions—federal agencies must position themselves to attract, develop and retain a top-quality workforce that can deliver results and ensure our nation’s continued growth and prosperity.

Equal opportunity in the federal workplace is key to accomplishing this goal. In order to develop a competitive, highly qualified workforce, federal agencies must fully utilize all workers’ talents, without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, sex or disability. While the promise of workplace equality is a legal right afforded all of our nation’s workers, equal opportunity is more than a matter of social justice. It is a national economic imperative. We must make full use of our nation’s human capital by promoting workplace practices that free up opportunities for the best and brightest talent available. All workers must compete on a fair and level playing field and have the opportunity to achieve their fullest potential.

Policies and practices that impede fair and open competition in the federal workplace cost the American economy millions of dollars each year. Perhaps most obviously, these are out-of-pocket costs paid by both agencies and federal workers in connection with workplace disputes. Perhaps less obvious—but just as expensive—are costs associated with decreased morale and productivity and the ineffective and inefficient use of human capital resources. These costs can—and should—be avoided. Agencies must make a firm commitment to the principles of equal opportunity and make those principles a fundamental part of agency culture.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) mandate that all federal personnel decisions be made free of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, reprisal and disability and also require that agencies establish a program of equal employment opportunity for all federal employees and job applicants. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 and 29 U.S.C. § 794.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has adjudicatory responsibilities in the federal EEO complaints process and oversight responsibility for federal programs required by Section 717 of Title VII and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act generally.

This Directive, which reflects recent and significant changes in the law, including recent Supreme Court decisions, supersedes earlier EEOC Management Directives and related interpretative memoranda on this subject and provides new guidance on the elements of a legally compliant Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs. This Directive requires agencies to take appropriate steps to ensure that all employment decisions are free from discrimination. It also sets forth the standards by which EEOC will review the sufficiency of agency Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs, which include periodic agency self-assessments and the removal of barriers to free and open workplace competition.

Additional information concerning federal sector equal employment opportunity law and programs can be found at EEOC’s website at [http://www.eeoc.gov/]. The EEOC will also supplement this Directive on an as-needed basis through the issuance of additional guidance and technical assistance.

Questions concerning this Directive should be directed to EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations.

There are six essential elements of the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act model programs under MD-715. These are: 1) a demonstrated commitment from agency leadership; 2) integration of EEO into the agency’s strategic mission; 3) effective affirmative action programs that meet the requirements of this Part that may later be made permanent through regulatory change; 4) policies and practices free from discrimination; 5) efficiency; and 6) responsiveness and legal compliance. Each of these elements is broadly defined in the introduction to MD-715:

Demonstrated Commitment From Agency Leadership

This Directive requires agency heads and other senior management officials to demonstrate a firm commitment to equality of opportunity for all employees and applicants for employment. Even the best workplace policies and procedures will fail if they are not trusted, respected and voluntarily opted-in to by the people who implement them. This is why this Directive establishes today practice and make those principles a fundamental part of agency culture. This commitment to equal opportunity must be embraced by agency leadership and communicated through the ranks from the top down. It is the responsibility of each agency head to take such measures as may be necessary to incorporate the principles of equal employment opportunity into the agency’s organizational structure.

To this end, agency heads must issue a written policy statement expressing their commitment to equal employment opportunity (EEO) and a workplace free of discriminatory harassment. This statement should be issued at the beginning of their tenure and thereafter on an annual basis and disseminated to all employees. In addition, agency heads and other senior management officials may, at their discretion, issue similar statements when important issues relating to equal employment opportunity arise within their agency or when important developments in the law occur.

Integration of EEO Into The Agency’s Strategic Mission

Equality of opportunity is essential to attracting, developing and retaining
the most qualified workforce to support the agency's achievement of its strategic mission. To this end, and in addition to the regulatory requirements found at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(4), as interpreted in Management Directive 110 at 1–1, agencies must:

Maintain a reporting structure that provides the agency's EEO Director with regular access to the agency head and other senior management officials for reporting on the effectiveness, efficiency and legal compliance of the agency's Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs. To emphasize the importance of the position, the agency head should be involved in the selection and performance review of the EEO Director.

Ensure EEO professionals are involved with, and consulted on, the management and deployment of human resources. The EEO Director should be a regular participant in senior staff meetings and regularly consulted on human resources issues.

Allocate sufficient resources to create and/or maintain Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs that: 1) identify and eliminate barriers that impair the ability of individuals to compete in the workplace because of race, national origin, sex or disability; 2) establish and maintain training and education programs designed to provide maximum opportunity for all employees to advance; and 3) ensure that unlawful discrimination in the workplace is promptly corrected and addressed.

Attract, develop and retain EEO staff with the strategic competencies necessary to accomplish the agency's EEO mission, and interface with agency officials, managers and employees.

Recruit, hire, develop and retain supervisors and managers who have effective managerial, communications and interpersonal skills. Provide managers and supervisors with appropriate training and other resources to understand and successfully discharge their duties and responsibilities.

Involve managers and employees in the implementation of the agency's Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs.

Use various media to distribute EEO information concerning federal EEO laws, regulations and requirements, rights, duties and responsibilities and to promote best workplace practices.

**Management and Program Accountability**

A model Title VII and Rehabilitation Act program will hold managers, supervisors, EEO officials and personnel officers accountable for the effective implementation and management of the agency's program. In ensuring such accountability, the agency must:

Conduct regular internal audits, on at least an annual basis, to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act programs and to ascertain whether the agency has made a good faith effort to identify and remove barriers to equality of opportunity in the workplace.

Establish procedures to prevent all forms of discrimination, including harassment, retaliation and failure to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities.

Evaluate managers and supervisors on efforts to ensure equality of opportunity for all employees.

Maintain clearly defined, well-communicated, consistently applied and fairly implemented personnel policies, selection and promotion procedures, evaluation procedures, rules of conduct and training systems.

Implement effective reasonable accommodation procedures that comply with applicable executive orders, EEO guidance, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board's Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards and Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards. Ensure that EEOC has reviewed those procedures when initially developed and if procedures are later significantly modified.

Be mindful of the agency's disability program obligations, including the provision of reasonable accommodations, when negotiating collective bargaining agreements with recognized labor organization(s) representing agency employees.

Ensure effective coordination between the agency's EEO programs and related human resource programs, including the Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program (FEORP), the Selective Placement Programs and the Disabled Veterans Affirmative Action Program (DVAAP).

Review each finding of discrimination to determine the appropriateness of taking disciplinary action against agency officials involved in the matter. Track these decisions and report trends, issues and problems to agency leadership for appropriate action.

Ensure compliance with settlement agreements and orders issued by the agency, EEOC, and EEO-related cases from the Merit Systems Protection Board, labor arbitrators, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority.

**Proactive Prevention of Unlawful Discrimination**

Agencies have an ongoing obligation to prevent discrimination on the bases of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, reprisal and disability, and eliminate barriers that impede free and open competition in the workplace. As part of this on-going obligation, agencies must conduct a self-assessment on at least an annual basis to monitor progress, identify areas where barriers may operate to exclude certain groups and develop strategic plans to eliminate identified barriers. A more detailed explanation of this process follows at Part A (Title VII) and Part B (Rehabilitation Act) of this Directive.

**Efficiency**

Agencies must have an efficient and fair dispute resolution process and effective systems for evaluating the impact and effectiveness of their EEO programs.

Maintain an efficient, fair and impartial complaint resolution process. Agencies should benchmark against EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 and other federal agencies of similar size highly ranked in EEOC's Annual Report on the federal sector complaints process.

Ensure that the investigation and adjudication function of the agency's complaint resolution process are kept separate from the legal defense arm of the agency or other agency offices with conflicting or competing interests.

Establish and encourage the widespread use of a fair alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program that facilitates the early, effective and efficient informal resolution of disputes. Appoint a senior official as the dispute resolution specialist of the agency charged with implementing a program to provide significant opportunities for ADR for the full range of employee-disputes. Whenever ADR is offered in a particular workplace matter, ensure that managers at all appropriate levels will participate in the ADR process.

Use a complaint tracking and monitoring system that permits the agency to identify the location, status, and length of time elapsed at each stage of the agency's complaint resolution process, the issues and the bases of the complaints, the aggrieved individuals/complainants, the involved management officials and other information necessary to analyze complaint activity and identify trends.

Identify, monitor and report significant trends reflected in complaint processing activity. Analysis of data relating to the nature and disposition of EEO complaints can provide useful insight into the extent to which an agency is meeting its obligations under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act.

Ensure timely and complete compliance with EEOC orders and the provisions of settlement/resolution agreements.

Maintain a system that collects and maintains accurate information on the race, national origin, sex and disability status of agency employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.601 for further guidance.

Maintain a system that tracks applicant flow data, which identifies applicants by race, national origin, sex and disability status and the disposition of all applications. EEOC will issue more detailed guidance on collecting and maintaining applicant flow data.

Maintain a tracking system of recruitment activities to permit analyses of these efforts in any examination of potential barriers to equality of opportunity.

Identify and disseminate best workplace practices.

**Responsiveness and Legal Compliance**

Federal agencies must:

Ensure that they are in full compliance with the law, including EEOC regulations, orders and other written instructions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).

Report agency program efforts and accomplishments to EEOC and respond to EEOC directives and orders in accordance with EEOC instructions and time frames.

Ensure that management fully and timely complies with final EEOC orders for corrective action and relief in EEO matters.

MD-715, Section II, Subpart A deals with the obligation of federal agencies to develop “an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity” under Title VII. This means that:

Section 717 of Title VII requires federal agencies to take proactive steps to ensure equal employment opportunity for all their employees and applicants for employment. This means that agencies must work to prevent potential discrimination before it occurs and establish systems to monitor compliance with Title VII. Agencies must regularly evaluate their employment practices to identify barriers to equality of opportunity for all individuals. Where such barriers are identified, agencies must take measures to eliminate them. With these steps, agencies will ensure that all persons are provided opportunities to participate in the full range of employment opportunities and achieve to their fullest potential.
The first requirement of Subpart A is that agencies must conduct an annual self-evaluation. This self-evaluation, described in Subpart A, Section II, requires agencies to monitor progress and identify areas where barriers may operate to exclude certain groups. A first step in conducting this self-assessment involves looking at the specific data, national origin and gender profile of relevant occupational categories in an agency's workforce. Guidance on how to group occupational categories will be provided separately. This "snapshot" can serve as a diagnostic tool to help agencies determine possible areas where barriers may exist and may require closer attention.

According to MD-715, this self-assessment provides a "statistical snapshot" that is a starting point for the identification of workplace barriers. It that snapshot must then be evaluated in light of the "totality of the circumstances."

The self-assessment must, at a minimum, include the following data for each agency as of the end of each fiscal year:
- Total workforce distribution by race, national origin and sex for both the permanent and temporary workforce;
- Permanent and temporary workforce participation rates for each grade level by race, national origin and sex;
- Permanent and temporary workforce participation rates for each of the agency's major occupational categories (divided by grade level) by race, national origin and sex;
- Participation rates in supervisory and management positions by race, national origin and sex;
- The race, national origin and sex of applicants for both permanent and temporary employment;
- The rates of selections for promotions, training opportunities and performance incentives by race, national origin and sex; and
- The rates of both voluntary and involuntary separations from employment by race, national origin and sex.

Id. Regarding the "rates of selection for promotions" portion of Part A II, the Commission held in Casie S. v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 0120100672 (2018), that nothing in that language requires the "agency to keep promotion applications categorized by national origin or Best Qualified Lists categorized by national origin."

The purpose of gathering this information is to help the agency identify meaningful disparities in its workforce and to focus further self-assessment. As the Commission explains:

In conducting its self-assessment, agencies shall compare their internal participation rates with corresponding participation rates in the relevant civilian labor force (CLF). Geographic areas of recruitment and hiring are integral factors in determining "relevant" civilian labor force participation rates. EEOC will provide appropriate civilian labor force data for use by agencies. With respect to positions typically filled through the internal promotion process or through transfers from other federal agencies, a self-assessment will involve looking at the racial, national origin and gender profile of the occupational categories and/or grade levels from which such promotions or transfers are typically made. EEOC will, from time to time, provide additional guidance on conducting the analysis.

The directive requires agencies to collect and maintain race, national origin and gender data on employees in both the permanent and temporary workforce, as well as on applicants for employment. Collection of the data from both employees and applicants should be by voluntary self-identification. See 29 CFR 1614.601.

Section III of Subpart A addresses barriers to equal employment opportunity under Title VII. If an agency's self-assessment identifies racial, national origin or gender-based disparities, it must then identify the barriers creating those disparities:

Workplace barriers can take various forms and sometimes involve a policy or practice that is neutral on its face. Identifying and evaluating potential barriers requires an agency to examine all relevant policies, practices, procedures and conditions in the workplace. The process further requires each agency to eliminate or modify, where appropriate, any policy, practice or procedure that creates a barrier to equality of opportunity.

For example, if a self-assessment revealed that Hispanics are virtually absent from the workforce in a facility, it would be logical for the agency to initially focus attention on its hiring and recruitment activities. The agency could rule out potential recruitment concerns if it determined that Hispanics were well represented among its applicants for employment. It would then be appropriate for the agency to examine all other aspects of the hiring process to identify the factor(s) responsible for the statistical disparity.

Id. The Commission suggests several questions that an agency might consider in identifying workplace barriers:

- Are recruitment efforts resulting in a cross-section of qualified applicants? Is there a significant disparity between the proportion of a racial, national origin or gender group in the agency's applicant pools and the proportion of that group in the relevant labor markets from which applicants are drawn?
- In a workforce where employees of a particular group are virtually absent, to what extent are employment opportunities unnecessarily restricted to internal applicants?
- Have supervisors, managers and executives been adequately trained on the agency's obligations under Title VII?
- Are there decision makers whose employment decisions have excluded individuals on the basis of race, national origin or sex?
- Are there any selection criteria that tend to screen out a particular racial, national origin or gender group?

Id. Subpart A, section III. Section IV of Subpart A discusses the evaluation and elimination of workplace barriers based on race, national origin or gender. The Commission provides the following example of how self-analysis might lead to identification of a workplace barrier that creates a racial disparity:

For example, statistical disparities are identified in an agency's auditor occupational group and further examination of the situation reveals the following: In the past, the auditor occupational group was racially diverse, including at the higher grade levels. However, after the agency instituted a requirement that auditors must be certified public accountants (CPAs) in order to be promoted to the GS-14 level or higher, few internal candidates held CPAs and therefore did not qualify for promotion opportunities to the higher level grades. As a result, the agency recruited candidates for these positions from a local business school with a student population that primarily came from the same racial group. Over time, auditors at the grade 14 level and above did not reflect the racial diversity of auditors at the lower grade levels. Assuming the requirement for a CPA is justified by business necessity, the agency has several options to consider in designing a response to this situation. Most obviously, the agency should increase its applicant pool for positions at the grade 14 and above by recruiting at other business schools with more diverse student populations. As an additional option, the agency might take steps to encourage its own auditors at the lower grade levels to pursue a CPA.

In order to assess the appropriateness of any policy, practice or condition that is identified as creating a statistical disparity, the Commission requires that agencies consider:

Whether the agency head can do more to demonstrate to the workforce, his or her commitment to equal employment opportunity;
- Whether there are budgetary or other restrictions governing a decision to limit recruitment to internal applicants;
- Whether certain qualification standards are truly necessary to the successful performance in a position; and
- Whether selection criteria used to assess qualifications that have been found to exclude or adversely impact a particular racial, national origin or gender group truly measure the knowledge, skills and abilities that they purport to measure, and whether alternative criteria are available that do not disadvantage any particular group.

Id., subpart A, section IV. Where an identified barrier serves no legitimate purpose, it must be eliminated immediately. Even if a policy that poses a barrier can be justified by business necessity, agencies must evaluate whether there is an alternative, less exclusionary practice that would serve the same purpose. If the self-analysis identifies barriers that are not within an agency's control, this should be brought to the attention of the EEOC.

MD-715 also suggests several measures that an agency can undertake to enhance and maximize opportunities for all employees:

Identifying career-enhancing opportunities such as details, developmental assignments, mentoring programs, etc. Structuring details or developmental assignments to expose a broad range of employees to a variety of positions within the agency.
- Assessing internal availability of candidates by identifying job-related skills, education, knowledge and abilities that may be obtained at lower levels in the same or similar occupational series.
- Conducting a skills-building inventory of agency employees, including but not limited to, current and potential gaps in skills and the distribution of skills. Developing an action plan to address these gaps.
- When appropriate, developing broad criteria for evaluating the knowledge, skills and abilities of applicants for particular positions that takes into account a range of experience and skills.

Subpart A, section IV. Subpart B of the MD-715 addresses the proactive prevention of discrimination under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. In the Rehabilitation Act, Congress required the federal government to become a model employer of individuals with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act requires each agency to establish and maintain "an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement to individuals with disabilities." As the Commission explains:
The mandate to serve as a model employer requires several things. First, agencies may not discriminate against qualified individuals with disabilities. But non-discrimination alone is not enough. The Rehabilitation Act also requires agencies to take proactive steps to ensure equal employment opportunity for individuals with disabilities. This means agencies must attempt to prevent discrimination before it occurs and must establish systems to monitor their own compliance with the Act. Agencies must regularly evaluate their employment practices to identify barriers to equality of opportunity for individuals with disabilities. Where such barriers are identified, agencies must eliminate them. With these steps, agencies will ensure that individuals with disabilities are provided opportunities to fully participate in employment opportunities and achieve to their fullest potential.

By incorporating provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act into the Rehabilitation Act, Congress defined the term discrimination to include:

- Making unlawful medical examinations or inquiries;
- Not providing reasonable accommodations to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on its operations;
- Denying job opportunities to an otherwise qualified applicant or employee because of the need for a reasonable accommodation;
- Using standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control;
- Limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
- Participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a qualified applicant or employee with a disability to prohibited discrimination; and
- Excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.

Id. Section I. Like Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act also includes protections against reprisal for participation in the EEO process or opposing any discriminatory practice under the Act. As with Subpart A, MD-715, as it relates to the Rehabilitation Act requires agencies to conduct a self-assessment of policies, practices and procedures that, directly or indirectly, relate to the employment of individuals with disabilities. For the purposes of Subpart B:

The term “employment” refers to the full range of employment decisions, including (but not limited to) hiring, advancement, retention, and other general terms, conditions and privileges of employment. The term “conditions” is intended to refer to the full range of environmental circumstances within an agency, including the physical layout and design of the structure in which the agency is located. In this regard, agencies should be mindful of their obligation to ensure that their physical structures and facilities comply with the requirements of the Architectural Barriers Act (42 U.S.C. § 4151 et seq.) and relevant titles of the ADA.

In addition, agencies are reminded of their responsibilities to bring physical structures and facilities into compliance with the Architectural Barriers Act. As with the self-assessment under Subpart A, the self-assessment of the agency's fulfillment of its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act is intended to provide a “statistical snapshot” as a starting point for the identification and elimination of employment barriers. However:

Agencies must be mindful that, while such numerical analyses can be useful as initial diagnostic and measuring tools, not all issues relating to their obligations under the Rehabilitation Act will lend themselves to such an analysis. Moreover, an agency can be liable for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act if its practices exclude even one individual on the basis of that individual's disability. It is the responsibility of each agency to be sensitive to any employment circumstance or condition that may be relevant to a disability and have a fundamental obligation to effect appropriate hiring, advancement and retention of individuals with disabilities, especially those with targeted disabilities.

Agencies are required to conduct the self-analysis on an annual basis with respect to the end of the fiscal year and, at a minimum, must include the following:

- Total workforce distribution of employees with disabilities for both the permanent and temporary workforce;
- Representation and distribution of employees with disabilities, by grade, in both the permanent and temporary workforce;
- Permanent and temporary workforce participation of employees with disabilities in major occupational groups by grades;
- The representation of individuals with disabilities among applicants for permanent and temporary employment;
- The representation of employees with disabilities among those who received promotions, training opportunities and performance incentives;
- The representation of employees with disabilities among those who were voluntarily and involuntarily separated;
- The effectiveness and efficiency with which the agency processes requests for reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act;
- The extent to which an agency is in compliance with Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act's requirement to provide employees with disabilities and others with information and data that is comparable to that provided to those without disabilities; and
- Information and trend data reflecting the nature, status and disposition of complaints in the administrative process (EEOC, MSPB and FLRA) and in court alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act.

Id., subpart B, section III. Unlike protected categories covered by Title VII, there is no comparable census data on individuals with disabilities and, the Commission notes, this makes a reliable statistical analysis based on general workforce data difficult.

However, a review of agency annual submissions to the EEOC reveals that some agencies fail to report themselves (compared to the federal government in general) through the number of employees with disabilities in their workforce. Until such time as reliable data is developed and disseminated concerning the general availability of individuals with disabilities in the workforce, this Directive recommends agencies evaluate themselves against the workforce profile of the federal government in general and that of agencies ranked highly, in this respect, in the most recent EEOC annual report on the federal workforce. All agencies, regardless of their relative standing, are strongly encouraged to effect steady and measurable progress with respect to the employment and advancement of individuals with disabilities.

In addition to the absence of reliable availability data for individuals with disabilities, any statistical analysis is complicated by the fact that disabilities are individual in nature, making gross statistical comparisons of limited value. Notwithstanding these limitations, an agency's analysis of the above information can help facilitate an assessment concerning the extent to which individuals with disabilities, especially those with targeted disabilities, are provided equal employment opportunities. Statistical information may be a useful starting point for a more thorough examination of the agency's physical facilities, electronic and information processing processes, personnel policies, selection and promotion procedures, evaluation procedures, rules of conduct and training systems to ensure full accessibility for individuals with disabilities.

Id. The collection and maintenance of data for the self-analysis also poses special problems because of the ADA prohibitions on the collection and distribution of medical information. Agencies are required to adopt procedures that ensure the information for the self-analysis is collected and managed consistent with ADA requirements regarding confidentiality. Information on individuals with disabilities may be collected in the following ways:

Agencies may use information obtained from Standard Form 256, the “Self-Identification of Handicap” form (SF 256) issued by the Office of Personnel Management, or other information that individuals choose to disclose about the existence of disabilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.601(f).

Agencies tracking applications from individuals with disabilities, or considering the use of excepted appointing authorities or other special programs, may invite applicants to indicate if they have the types of disabilities that are covered by the program at issue.

Whenever an agency invites an applicant or employee to provide information about his/her disability, the agency must clearly notify such individual that: (a) response to the invitation is voluntary and refusal to provide the information will not subject the individual to any adverse treatment; (b) the information will be kept confidential and used only for affirmative action purposes; and (c) individuals may self-identify at any time during their employment and failure to complete SF 256 or to respond to pre-offer invitations will not excuse the agency from Rehabilitation Act requirements.

Id. To ensure confidentiality, medical and disability-related information must be collected and maintained on separate forms, kept in separate files and treated as confidential medical records.

The information collected may be put to limited, authorized uses:

For affirmative action purposes alone, medical and disability-related